Globalisation and Humiliation:
Towards a New Paradigm

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Abstract

This paper argues that an effective strategy for promoting peace in conditions of globalisation depends upon making an accurate assessment of benign (peace-promoting) and malign (peace-obstructing) tendencies at work in two areas: firstly, the sphere of science and technology; and, secondly, the development of relations between human groups. It is argued that the benign consequences of science and technology may be inhibited and undermined by certain malign tendencies in human relations. In this latter respect, particular emphasis is placed upon the destructive tendencies associated with humiliation. It is further argued that the more widespread the influence of the orientation towards knowledge described here as ‘the epistemological revolution,’ the greater the chances for the development of a situation in which benign tendencies in human relations coincide with and reinforce benign tendencies in science and technology. The argument of the paper is compared with the contrasting position to be found in the works of major exponents of critical theory such as Adorno and Habermas.

Introduction

Swami Agnivesh is a highly influential Indian holy man. He abhors the destructive conflict running through his country’s politics and urges the Indian ‘government and all political parties, scientists, labour and socio-religious organisations to wage a united battle against starvation, poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, bonded labour and other social evils.’

However, in 1998 this man, apparently so dedicated to peace, congratulated Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee for conducting a series of nuclear tests. He approved of the tests because, in his view, they showed that India would not bow down before the ‘nuclear blackmail’ of foreign countries like America.

These two stances, apparently so contradictory, crystallise two tendencies at work in the global arena. On the one hand, a dedication to peaceful co-operation for the good of all humankind; on the other hand, an aggressive posture directed against the West and backed up with the threat of violence.

This paper presents an assessment of some powerful currents within the tide of globalisation in terms of whether they drive towards peace or war. The future of global society will be decided, in part at least, by which way people like Swami Agnivesh turn. An opinion leader like him could become a force for either peace or war. A great deal depends upon how the
processes of globalisation affect the character of human relationships at every level from the local communities to international relations.

The paper is a contribution towards a rigorous interdisciplinary framework of analysis that I am developing (Lindner 1999; Lindner 2000a forthcoming; Lindner 2000b forthcoming; Lindner 2000c forthcoming) in association with Dennis Smith. The object is to understand the nature of humiliation as a macro-social process, an interpersonal mechanism and an emotion experienced by individuals and groups. Humiliation theory is concerned with:

i) the ways that humiliation influences motivation and identity;

ii) the ways that humiliation operates as a set of mechanisms within human relationships;

iii) the ways that humiliation contributes to the formation, reproduction and undermining of coercive social and political hierarchies;

iv) and the ways in which the psychological and social harm caused by humiliation may be alleviated.

The concerns of humiliation theory overlap, on the one hand, with the school of critical theory inaugurated by Adorno and Horkheimer and, on the other hand, with the theory of the civilizing process inaugurated by Norbert Elias. In a recent paper Dennis Smith has contrasted humiliation theory with Elias’s theory of the civilizing process. In this complementary paper, I distinguish our position from a central tendency in the tradition represented by critical theory.

This tendency can be stated by briefly summarising some key points in the sequence of thought represented by Adorno and his one-time pupil, Jürgen Habermas. Both men were concerned about the potential for alienation and dehumanisation that lay in modern capitalism. To oversimplify, Adorno was a pessimist and saw science and technology as a malign force. In his view, the Enlightenment had taken positivism too far and turned it into a way of controlling human beings from above in a very rigid way.

Habermas has been more optimistic. He has investigated the idea that human beings have an emancipatory interest in reaching a consensus based upon a shared perception of ‘truth’ and a shared notion of how society should be organised. The tone of Habermas’s writings, especially his early work, suggests that there is a logic ‘pushing’ human beings towards consensus and emancipation. There is, he suggests, a strong tendency in human relations working in this direction. Habermas has identified a potential direction in which human relations might be encouraged to develop, but, as will be seen shortly, I wish to emphasise an alternative possibility that represents a profound danger for the outcome he favours.

The positions of Adorno and Habermas are well known. All I wish to do in this paper is assert that they may be taken to represent, retrospectively, an emphasis upon malign tendencies (especially alienation and dehumanisation) as far as science and technology are concerned (Adorno) and benign tendencies (favouring dialogue, consensus and the pursuit of ‘truth’) within human relationships (Habermas). The two writers, taken together, express a sequence of thoughts that may be stated in a radically simplified form as follows: the malign consequences of science and technology may be moderated and overcome by certain benign tendencies in human relations.

Once this has been stated, it is possible to identify my own, contrasting position. It has two elements (see table one). The first point is that certain benign consequences of science and
technology may be inhibited and undermined by malign tendencies in human relations. In this respect I want to emphasise the destructive tendencies associated with humiliation. The second point is that as what I call the ‘epistemological revolution’ gains ground and extends to all aspects of the relationships human beings have with each other and with nature, benign tendencies open up. This is a situation in which benign tendencies in human relations coincide with and reinforce benign tendencies in science and technology.

TABLE ONE
MALIGN AND BENIGN HUMAN RELATIONS AND SCIENCE/TECHNOLOGY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Malign human relations</th>
<th>Benign human relations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malign science and technology</td>
<td>Basic assumptions:</td>
<td>Basic assumptions:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• It is in the nature of human beings to fight and kill AND</td>
<td>• Technology is inherently destructive BUT</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Science and technology is inherently destructive.</td>
<td>• Human beings have a capacity for creative and peaceful dialogue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benign science and technology</td>
<td>Basic assumptions:</td>
<td>Basic assumptions:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Technology, though partly destructive has a benign potential through its unintended effects BUT</td>
<td>• The epistemological revolution produces benign relations between humankind and nature AND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Processes of humiliation have a malign effect.</td>
<td>• Benign relations between human beings.</td>
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The rest of this paper is organised in the following way. In the next part of the paper I discuss the benign consequences of science and technology, especially what I call ‘the epistemological revolution,’ a term to be explained shortly. In the following part of the paper I analyse malign tendencies in human relations with particular reference to humiliation. In the final part of the paper I consider a possible healing strategy for alleviating the worst effects of malign tendencies in human relations by exploiting the benign potential of the epistemological revolution.

This paper is part of a series of papers about humiliation. It has its place within a larger research project that looks at humiliation and its connection to war and violent conflict. The project’s objective is to examine how relevant humiliation is in hampering peace. The cases studied include recent instances of genocide in Africa (Somalia and Rwanda/Burundi), with Germany’s history of war and Holocaust providing the European angle. About 200 interviews have been carried out in Africa (Somalia, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, Egypt) and Europe (England, Norway, Germany, Switzerland) from 1997-1999. The results of this study will be mentioned in this text only as far as they shed light on the argument presented.
The ‘epistemological revolution’ and the benign consequences of science and technology

This paper makes the suggestion that an ‘epistemological revolution’ is currently unfolding, increasingly forming the basis of science, technology, and even human relations, and that this revolution is essentially beneficial to the peaceful and sustainable survival of humankind.

When the Christian church allowed what we today would call ‘scientific knowledge’ into its monasteries, it ultimately undermined, without meaning to, its own power position. Basing knowledge on scientific testing of worldviews against ‘reality’ is bound to profoundly alter the status of religious beliefs, since those beliefs cannot be tested in this way. By the time of the Renaissance, what Bill Ury has called a ‘knowledge revolution’ (Ury 1999) was underway.

Scientific reality-testing did not just start off a ‘knowledge revolution.’ More importantly, I suggest, it began an ‘epistemological revolution’ that is gaining ground in our own era of global interdependence. Kuhn opened our eyes to the process of paradigm shift (Kuhn 1962). Today, a new meta-paradigm is coming into being, namely continuous shifting, as opposed to staying fixed most of the time. Refining and revising theory, moving ‘down’ to empirical data then back ‘up’ to theory in a continuously turning circle, maintaining a never-ending ‘reflective equilibrium’ (Rawls 1971): this is the approach to knowledge in the global era. The ultimate revolution within the knowledge revolution is this ‘epistemological revolution,’ or the widespread acceptance of the new ‘meta-paradigm of continuous shifting,’ the continuous testing of worldviews in relation to reality. Clinging to rigid worldviews at all cost is ‘out.’

The old era was marked by emphasis on the particular contents of a theory or worldview, contents which occasional were overthrown. The new meta-paradigm of the epistemological revolution has method as its contents, the method of how to manage theories and worldview, namely through ‘openness to continuous revision.’

Before this era it was the rule to find a worldview, theory or ideology and then stick to it, almost at any cost. Copernicus and Galileo were not welcome; the church did not want to let new worldviews gain ground. Today this approach would be unthinkable. Natural science has taught humankind how fragile and changeable knowledge is. It just takes a better microscope technology to open up a whole new micro-cosmos; a bigger Cern, means that new particles are detected; the Hubble space telescope is launched and, as a result, a new universe uncovers itself. Cholesterol was once seen as entirely ‘bad,’ but shortly afterwards the experts discovered that the situation is more complicated than that. Nuclear power was one of the most powerful eye openers, Chernobyl a brutal lesson teaching humankind to be more careful, more humble, less arrogantly sure.

Natural science teaches us to ask ‘Is there reliable knowledge?’ An extensive epistemological debate pivots around this and related questions. This debate affects the human psyche, it creates fear, the basic state of the ‘risk society’ (Beck 1992; Beck 2000). Post-modernism even incorporates this fear within its interpretations by concluding that grand narratives have lost all validity.

Therefore, at first glance, the transition from fixed worldviews to the continuous revision of theories and ideologies does not seem favourable to sustainability and peace. Instead, it might be thought, it tends to breed insecurity and fear. However, at a second glance, - and this is the point this paper wants to make, - a stable and mature attitude of uncertainty and doubt is a disposition that is highly conducive to environmental sustainability and social peace.
Knowing that nothing is sure makes people anxious but it also stops them being arrogant. The awareness that one’s judgements have to be continuously tested against reality prepares the ground for more humility, modesty, and flexibility.

The epistemological revolution may be more important than the knowledge revolution, - not just within science but also – indeed, especially - among the lay population. The acceptance that our knowledge and understanding of reality is always changing makes people listen. It makes them listen to reality, and listen to the other. They learn that it is not good enough to sit back and just imagine that one has understood the world and other people.

Listening to environmental reality may lead to more sustainable technology, and listening to the other person to more sustainable human relations; in other words ‘peace’ with the environment is supplemented by peaceful relationships between people. The massive expansion in the market for books, seminars and workshops on ‘how to communicate better’ illustrates this. People struggle to improve their communication skills; they learn empathy and taking the perspective of the other. This means learning to sit up and to look into the other’s eyes (Lévinas 1998), it means trying to enter into a real dialogue. It is this dialogue in daily human encounters that is the social equivalent to the epistemological revolution in the field of science and technology. This article is intended to be a contribution to this very dialogue, as part of the endeavour to increase empathy and taking the perspective of the other.

Enlightenment introduced the concept of reality-testing, but did not yet teach humility with regard to the results. This brought about rigid adherence to theories and technological solutions even when they were dangerous. Theories were treated like quasi-religious beliefs (Kuhn); their advocates turned them into fortresses and defended them against ‘enemies.’ The full benign potential of enlightenment is only reaped when reality-testing is implemented in a continuous, open-minded, flexible and never-ending manner. Enlightenment’s malign effects may therefore be interpreted as a result of the yet incomplete application of its basic principle, namely reality-testing. The continuous application of this principle - continually checking out the world and never accepting that one has arrived at a condition of certainty in any aspect of one’s beliefs, perceptions and assumptions – this is what is meant by the ‘epistemological revolution’ in this paper.

To summarise, the epistemological revolution introduces humility and flexibility into the handling of environmental and human relations. It thus enhances humankind’s knowledge base for building sustainable environmental and human relations. These are the direct benign effects of the epistemological revolution, mainly unintended and unforeseen since scientists usually undertake research for the sake of the topic they are interested in, and not in order to make the world a more humble place. But the fact that effects are unplanned does not weaken their impact or their importance.

Critical theory wants to warn us, shake us, and wake us up to technology’s dangers. It tells us that naïve admiration for scientific ‘progress’ and technology is ill advised because technology will destroy its creators rather than ushering in an era of well-being. Critical theory makes us aware that the very technology, which many have welcomed in a blue-eyed way, may have disastrous consequences, however little this is intended by its creators.

My position differs insofar as I suggest (i) that science and technology have a methodological foundation which is basically beneficial if fully implemented, namely the ‘epistemological revolution.’ This is what has been discussed above. Furthermore, I propose (ii) that
technology has, alongside its malign unintended consequences, a number of benign unintended consequences. These will be examined in the following section of the paper.

The main practical outcome of scientific reality-testing, namely technology, has paid dividends. Scientists, technologists and engineers have produced advances that are widely valued. Aircraft and spaceships are breathtakingly convincing evidence of technological power. It is true that technology destroys natural resources, pollutes the earth, and produces the ills so eloquently addressed by Adorno, Horkheimer and Habermas. However, science may also have the potential to correct such shortcomings. That this happens too slowly may partly be caused, as mentioned above, by the fact that the epistemological revolution has still not gone far enough; theories and beliefs are not being challenged, tested and revised quickly enough. While critical theory interprets technology’s destructive effects as being inherent in technology’s essential nature, this paper attributes the destructive effects of technology to another cause, namely the fact that the epistemological revolution is far from incomplete.

This paper proposes that there is one field of technology in particular that has constructive, benign effects, fostering sustainable and peaceful relations between humans and their environment. This is the technological field that brings about improved mobility and communication between people.

Five themes will be highlighted in the following, illustrating the benign unintended consequences of technology. These are: (1) interdependence, (2) the transition from ‘fear of enemies’ to ‘problems with bad neighbours,’ (3) the increased significance of creativity as a means of growth, the (4) development of an increasingly egalitarian human rights society, and (5) the shift towards the imagery of ‘one global village.’

**Interdependence**

Technologies enhancing communication and mobility have set off an entire cascade of changes, bringing people together and promoting what Ury calls the ‘ingathering of humanity into one interactive and interdependent global community’ (Ury 1999, 98). As people increasingly look beyond the boundaries of their villages, nations and continents, we nowadays reach the point where one single in-group inhabits one single global village.

People who live in one global village have to get along with each other. They might not like each other, but they know that it is difficult to run off or send unwanted people away. Australia is a penal colony no longer. The American ‘Wild West’ has been closed. Citizens of the global village become neighbours.

Admittedly, neighbourhood does not mean peace. As is only too well known, neighbours do not necessarily love each other; bitter conflicts often divide them. There are ‘good’ and ‘bad’ neighbours. Communities address the problem of the ‘bad neighbour’ with various societal conflict-resolution mechanisms such as the police or the law courts. Undoubtedly, there are too few such institutions in place at the global level yet, but attempts are being made. Today, the function of soldiers, in the western world at least, is not to ‘kill enemies,’ but, increasingly, play the role of police in the global village.

If we look back more than ten thousand years, people lived in relative isolation and consequently might not have had the need to learn about or empathise with those who are different and far away. Nor did they need to fight them. William Ury, anthropologist and global negotiator, reminds us that organised warfare may have been absent until about ten
thousand years ago (Ury 1999). War started when the earth became ‘full’ and people ‘met.’ When people ‘meet’ more, they fight more. But, - and this paper wishes to contribute to this very goal, - they may eventually also learn to co-operate. In order to co-operate across cultures we today need to educate ourselves about the ‘other,’ the ‘foreigner.’

Global interdependence means an end to the old image of imperial warfare. Today’s wars are, in fact, civil wars (Wallensteen and Axell 1994) between neighbours who are bitterly intertwined. The bitterness of the combatants is, indeed, probably greater than that experienced by conscript armies in former days who were ordered to shoot at each other. The bitterness stems from the fact that people who have just become neighbours might make friends with each other, but they might also become jealous, and hurt and humiliate each other. Without conflict resolution mechanisms in the global village, such bitterness will be very destructive.

To summarise, global interdependence could be described as a secondary unplanned benign consequence of those realms of technology that provide global mobility and communication. The resulting need to get along with each other can be expected to advance peace, at least in the long run. In the short run, however, it might lead to the very opposite, namely an increase in bitter feelings. This point will be discussed in greater depth further down. For example, the world’s poor may not appreciate having immensely rich neighbours, nor being dependent on them while staying poor themselves; they may revolt. They may not like a situation in which the ‘global village’ means ‘global pillage’ (Brecher and Costello 1994). In the long run, the rich will have to learn to take the perspective of their poor neighbours and ‘make peace’ with them. The need to get along with each other will force them to do this.

**Neighbours**

Another benign unintended consequence of mobility and communication technology and the resulting formation of one single global village is the transformation of the ‘enemy’ into the ‘bad neighbour.’

There have been times in human history, when it was dangerous even to leave one’s local parish. ‘Bandits’ were waiting just a few kilometres outside. It was very dangerous to move around. The ‘outside’ was full of menaces. Even monsters and trolls were imagined behind the next mountain range. The ‘outside’ was where traditionally ‘enemies’ came from. ‘Enemies’ are typically those ‘who threaten from the “outside” and have to repelled or killed.’

Stephan & Stephan show that ‘Fear, in particular, may drive the belief that out-groups are hostile towards one’s own group, thereby promoting anticipatory aggression’ (Stephan and Stephan 1985). In a world of fear it is ‘rational’ for mothers to teach their sons to become ‘tough’ and not fear death in battle. In a world of fear Classical and Structural Realism (in International Relations Theory) are appropriate. They explain that and why war is inevitable in the context of the ‘Security Dilemma’ that characterises the world’s ‘State of Anarchy’ (Hobbes).

In contrast, today everyone has a place ‘inside’ the global village. There is no population ‘outside.’ The idea of ‘outside’ becomes meaningless in the context of one interdependent world. Along with the concept of the ‘outside,’ the idea of the ‘enemy’ is bound to lose meaning. In the global village, though the word ‘enemy’ might still be in use, its significance is transformed. When closely examined, it increasingly carries connotations of ‘bad neighbour.’ The core difference between the two concepts is that ‘neighbours’ are not killed.
with the same ease as ‘enemies.’ Defining someone or some group as an ‘enemy to be killed’ becomes increasingly difficult today. International terrorism, threatening as it is, still throws into stark relief how used many of us (especially the privileged ones in the west) are used to moving around safely in the global village.

International terrorists are so to speak ‘very bad neighbours,’ rather than traditional ‘enemies’ or ‘monsters.’ We may even see them being interviewed on the BBC. A simple calculation suggests that the total amount of fear in the world should have diminished in the course of globalisation. ‘Enemies’ are gone, and ‘bad neighbours’ have always been around. The extent of the unknown and, therefore, dangerous, ‘outside’ has diminished and dwindled. This reduction of fear should advance peace.

The transformation of the notion ‘enemy’ to the notion ‘bad neighbour’ could thus be called the second unintentional and unforeseen benign consequence of the epistemological revolution and one of its achievements, improved mobility and communication technology.

Creativity
The third unintended benign consequence may be identified in terms of the transformation currently underway from ‘coercion’ and ‘conformity’ to ‘persuasion’ and ‘creativity.’

The disappearance of the ‘outside’ and the ‘enemy,’ combined with increased interdependence, means that it makes much less sense to try and coerce others. Furthermore, once there is no longer a substantial ‘outside’ to exploit or destroy, increased effort have to be directed towards creating new resources by a more careful and productive handling of relationships with fellow ‘insiders.’ If we are dependent upon each other, there is a strong incentive for us to e, especially when increasing the total amount of resources depends upon releasing human creativity. Increasingly, creativity within relatively egalitarian relationships replaces coercion within rigid hierarchies.

Creativity is a fragile flower; it needs to breathe the air of freedom and motivation. Creativity cannot be ordered and coercion does not produce creative employees. In the global era, a nation that wishes to increase its power and influence will not do well by conquering and enslaving a neighbouring country. Oppressed people are usually only creative when they plan sabotage. A global interdependent market place makes coercion look inefficient. Creativity has become the ‘golden path.’

The current shift in local and global organisations towards flat hierarchies and teams working together towards creative solutions, using persuasion instead coercion: all this sounds like peace. However, the global marketplace also has its dark sides. This will be addressed in more detail further down. The current development towards egalitarian creative teams does not yet include all citizens of the global village. The workings of the global market currently produce vast economic inequalities. Though this is not occurring through direct coercion, it is brought about by negligence of the basic human right to have a decent life. The World Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen (1994) and the demonstrations in connection with recent WTO negotiations (1999) are both attempts to address this violation of human rights (see, for example, former president of Ireland, now UN High Commissioner of Human Rights Mary Robinson 1999). This point, which anticipates the next section of this paper, refers to a malign consequence of current tendencies in human relations.
Human rights and ‘nature rights’

The human rights revolution could be said to be the fourth benign consequence of mobility and communication. In former times, underlings rose and were beaten down again, or they won and became masters themselves. Revolutions were singular events that kept hierarchy in place while attempting to change the ranking of players. Today mobility and communication technology are making a continuous never-ending revolution more practicable than ever and continuous oppression more difficult than ever. Human rights introduce the notion of personal dignity. It is no longer legitimate to enslave people or subordinate them in humiliating hierarchical structures. Human rights tell us that every person ought to be respected in her capacity as a human being, independently of rank and status.

Though the ideal of human rights promotes peace, the introduction of this new ‘ought’ where no obligation existed before has also created a host of new injuries, namely violations of human rights. These violations have to be prevented or healed; otherwise they foster violent uprisings of the injured. This point also anticipates the argument of the next section of the paper.

The human rights revolution is accompanied by what can be called ‘nature rights revolution.’ In other words, not only the relationship between humans is currently being continuously scrutinised, but also human relations with nature. Nature, - as well as the poor in the world,- has advocates who keep their plight continuously on the agenda of humankind.

Image of ‘Blue Planet’

The fifth indirect and unintended benign consequence of modern technology is that it provides us with images of unity and interdependence that were unthinkable until very recently. Today almost every household is provided with the view of the astronaut on the planet earth. Hardly any television news programme starts without the image of the globe turning slowly to the introductory tune. This view provides human beings with a new perspective – a new ‘point of view’ - from which to visualise ‘One earth.’ Earth as the blue planet seen by an astronaut is an image no previous generation ever had the chance to see. Not only the imagery, also the terminology of ‘One Village,’ ‘One World,’ ‘Global Village’ expresses the new ‘gut-feeling’: ‘we are all one in-group!’ It becomes an urgent and obvious fact that we are all in the same small boat.

What makes the imagery and terminology of the global village and the blue planet especially beneficiary for peace is its benign ‘framing power.’ Ross carried out important experiments showing the effect of ‘framing’ (Ross and Samuels 1993). He asked players to play a game, the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. In this game it is possible either to co-operate with the other players, or not. Where there is co-operation, all participants gain in the long run. However, in the short run the individual player can win more by defecting. In Ross’s experiments one group of players was told that they would be playing a game called a ‘community game.’ Another group was told that they were going to play a ‘Wallstreet game.’ Players who thought that they played a ‘community game’ tended to co-operate, players who thought they were playing a ‘Wallstreet game’ tended to defect. Although the structure of the game was identical, in both cases the Prisoner’s Dilemma structure, the mere difference in the label had a profound effect upon whether or not players co-operated. This suggests that as the imagery and terminology of one world, one global village, becomes more widespread, the chances for global peace will increase.
Table two presents a simplified overview of the above argument. Scientific reality-testing evolves from a sequence of rigid paradigms, each reigning with an iron fist while it lasted, to a continuous flow of reality-testing without lapsing into rigidity (‘epistemological revolution’). At the same time, technology that facilitates mobility and communication is creating a single global village of neighbours, one whose unity and vulnerability can be observed from space. Both tendencies may facilitate peace.

**TABLE TWO**

**PEACE, TECHNOLOGY AND THE ‘EPISTEMOLOGICAL REVOLUTION’**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SCIENTIFIC REALITY-TESTING</th>
<th>RIGID HANDLING OF THEORIES AND WORLDVIEWS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobility- and communication-technology</td>
<td>‘EPISTEMOLOGICAL REVOLUTION’: HUMBLE AND FLEXIBLE HANDLING OF THEORIES AND WORLDVIEWS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation of one interdependent global village (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astronaut’s view on ‘One World’ (5)</td>
<td>‘Enemies’ replaced by ‘bad neighbours’ (2), coercion replaced by persuasion and creativity (3), in a sustainable and egalitarian human rights society (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘EPISTEMOLOGICAL REVOLUTION’: HUMBLE AND FLEXIBLE HANDLING OF THEORIES AND WORLDVIEWS</td>
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Table three summarises the argument in another way, contrasting the state of the world before and after the epistemological revolution.
The world contains ‘several villages.’
Mobility- and communication-technology is still limited. The meta-paradigm of continuous revision of views is not yet in place and fixed worldviews prevail.

The world is ‘one global village.’
Mobility- and communication-technology is increasingly open to everyone. The meta-paradigm of continuous revision of views is in use and more flexible and humble worldviews are the result.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stationary life in isolation (1)</th>
<th>Mobility and interdependence (1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fear of ‘enemies’ (2)</td>
<td>Problems with ‘bad neighbours’ (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercion as means for ‘growth’ (3)</td>
<td>Persuasion and creativity as means for ‘growth’ (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchical honour-societies (4)</td>
<td>Egalitarian human rights societies (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imagery of ‘several villages’ (5)</td>
<td>Imagery of ‘one global village’ (5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To conclude this section, the epistemological revolution, in other words the spread of an open-minded, open-ended form of enlightenment, has benign consequences for sustainability and peace in the ecological and human realm. This is because of the humility and flexibility built into its approach to testing hypotheses. These consequences are certainly not straight forward, nor are they necessarily intentionally aimed at; scientists do not necessarily wish to achieve humility through their research. However, the consequences, however secondary and unforeseen, are real.

The developments in science and technology produced by the Enlightenment have had innumerable malign effects as discussed by critical theory. However, as I have argued, there have also been unintended benign consequences, especially with regard to technology furthering mobility and communication. In-groups at all times in human history have developed and used societal mechanisms to regulate their interconnectedness, starting with sitting under a tree for negotiations to modern stately institutions as police and law court. We are rapidly becoming one single interdependent in-group inhabiting one planet, locked into the need to co-operate and equipped with centuries- old knowledge and experience about how to maintain the cohesion of in-groups. We should be able to maintain global peace under these conditions.

So far, the analysis has focused upon certain benign tendencies associated with science, technology and the epistemological revolution. The next section of the paper discusses some potentially malign tendencies in human relations associated with humiliation.
The malign consequences of humiliation

As I have written elsewhere, humiliation involves the ‘enforced lowering of a person or group, a process of subjugation that damages or strips away their pride, honour or dignity. To be humiliated is to be placed, against your will and often in a deeply hurtful way, in a situation that is greatly inferior to what you feel you should expect. Humiliation entails demeaning treatment that transgresses established expectations. It involves acts of force, including violent force. At its heart is the idea of pinning down, putting down or holding to the ground. Indeed, one of the defining characteristics of humiliation as a process is that the victim is forced into passivity, acted upon, made helpless’ (Lindner 2000c, forthcoming).

When a Somali crowd dragged an American soldier’s corpse through the streets of Mogadishu, it was an act of revenge for the humiliation inflicted upon them by the UN and the West. a triumphant crowd. To quote a former Somali diplomat, ‘the UN came with the agenda that they know what is good for the Somali people […]…got entangled in the fight with [General] Aideed, … spent so much money on that …[and] caused the death of no less than 10,000 Somalis!’

Compare Germany. After World War I the Allies made it their business to humiliate their vanquished enemy. They would have done better to read the thoughts of Thomas Hoccleve (born around 1368), who, in discussing the Hundred Years War, contrasted the ‘temporary’ peace that is the result of the end of war with a ‘true’ peace that is long lasting and much more preferable. In the event, Hitler later worked upon the feelings of resentment within German society and used those feelings with disastrous effectiveness. Their depth and force were a reservoir upon which he drew in the 1930s and early 1940s, enabling him to impose a Nazi regime, take Germany to war and carry through the Holocaust. After 1945, the Allies behaved in a different way. Germany was given help to rebuild its industrial economy, brought into NATO and the European Community and, more generally, treated with much greater respect as an important neighbour.

The history of the last century strongly suggests that humiliation can lead to war, Holocaust, genocide, ethnic cleansing and terrorism. However, humiliation has not been studied in a systematic way. The field has been fragmented, encompassing a highly divergent set of themes. What has not been properly recognised is that humiliation is a term that systematically connects many aspects of the human condition: firstly a societal process (oppressive hierarchy), secondly a process between people including a perpetrator and a victim (interpersonal act), and not least, it is an emotional state (feeling humiliated).

The themes discussed in the last section were the epistemological revolution, mobility, interdependence, the transition from ‘fear of enemies’ to ‘problems with bad neighbours,’ the increased significance of creativity as a means of growth, the development of an increasingly egalitarian human rights society, and the shift to the imagery of ‘one global village.’ How do humiliation mechanisms and processes relate to these themes?

With respect to increasing global interdependence and its consequences, social psychological research offers us the ‘contact hypothesis.’ Increased geographical mobility may be associated with increased tolerance (Kalin and Berry 1980). Also, the degree of ethnic mixing in a given area may correlate with tolerance (Kalin and Berry 1982). According to
Bond (Bond 1998, 1), ‘One way to explain these results is to assume that inter-group social capital increases as a result of non-hostile contact and exchanges across group lines.’

Bond continues: ‘However, recent work on this “contact hypothesis,” makes it clear that only certain types of such contacts promote positive relations.’ Several conditions, for example inequality, seem to hamper the creation of positive relations. Bond cites the following summary from an unpublished manuscript by Stephan et al: Conditions are optimal ‘When prior relations between groups have been amicable, the groups are relatively equal in status, the members do not strongly identify with the in-group, and contact has been extensive, voluntary, positive, individualized, and cooperative.’ (Stephan, Ybarra, and Bachman 1998, 15).

This summary is consistent with the findings of my own research that draws attention to the most powerful obstructor of positive relations, namely the process of humiliation. My research suggests that humiliation is the worst hurt, the deepest wound. Sometimes it makes reconciliation almost impossible, as experience from therapy illustrates.

Many people argue that the main destroyer of peace is not people’s psyche but the harsh factual reality of the life situation confronting them. Competition for scarce resources, for example, puts opponents into a difficult win-lose situation. When the size of the pie of resources is fixed, the one who gains resources ‘steals’ them from the other. This sounds like an effective recipe for violence. One might ask: ‘Why bring in the additional factor of humiliation?’

However, an equally important question is: ‘Does a situation of scarcity in itself compel participants to take part in war, violence and massacre?’ After all, competition for scarce resources may also lead to co-operation where the relationship between potential contestants is a constructive one. Books like Ury’s Getting to Peace (1999) provide strategies for dealing with conflict constructively. As has been argued elsewhere, approaches such as Ury’s will be even more effective when explicit account is taken of the effects of humiliation.

I claim that humiliation is the worst obstacle to the constructive and peaceful management of conflicts because it is the deepest hurt. It is a trauma that occurs in relation to other people, not in relation to natural forces like after a natural disaster. Furthermore, in many cases it is not merely one single disaster, but a process, a protracted painful situation. Humiliation creates maximum protracted traumatic stress, and directs its aftermath (for example anger) largely against the (real or imagined) perpetrator, not just against impersonal natural forces (as in the case of natural disaster), or against oneself (as in the case of depression). Intense protracted traumatic stress whose aftermath involves the targeting of the perpetrator (or a scapegoat): this is the effect of humiliation, and such a social and psychological condition may be the most powerful peace obstructor imaginable.

Humiliation has always been part of the human condition, but it has gained significance with the human rights revolution. In Humiliation and the Human Condition: Mapping a Minefield I present a typology that shows that humiliating others was once a legitimate practice within the societal framework of hierarchical societal structures. The human rights revolution delegitimises those practices. ‘To humiliate a person is now regarded as one of the worst violations possible. It is akin to the destruction of that person, an intolerable violation of their inner core of dignity as a human being’ (Lindner 2000b, forthcoming). In ‘honourable’ societies, subjugation was normal and accepted. When people have been ‘dignified’ by the
acquisition of human rights, humiliation is regarded as a moral outrage that is very difficult to forgive or forget. It is often, I would argue, a fruitful exercise to look behind instances of violence, genocide, and war to see whether humiliation has played a part in bringing them about. I argue that the core outcome of humiliation is division: in its least dramatic expression this takes the supposedly ‘harmless’ form of ‘cultural difference;’ in its most destructive expression in takes such horrific forms as massacre, genocide and Holocaust.

The two ends of the scale are more closely related than one might think. In How Humiliation Can Create Culture Difference (Lindner 2000a, forthcoming) I take the cases of Germany and Somalia, both, intriguingly, unified, yet also divided. Ethnic Somalis, for example, are united by language, culture, and devotion to Islam. When Somalia became independent in 1960 a dream existed, the dream of a united Somalia. As a Somali intellectual puts it, ‘Most other African countries are colonially created states in search of a sense of nationhood. The Somali, by contrast, are a pre-colonial nation in search of a unified post-colonial state. Most other African countries are diverse peoples in search of a shared national identity. The Somali are already a people with a national identity in search of territorial unification.’ (Mazrui 1986, 71).

Similarly, the Germans think of themselves as ‘One people.’ When the Berlin Wall fell in late 1989, East Germans declared ‘Wir sind ein Volk! [We are one people!]’ and happily greeted West Germans as they paraded through the streets of Berlin.

Somalia dreamt of unification when it became independent in 1960, but has become a deeply divided country instead. There has been internal strife and civil war for more than two decades, involving acts of cruel humiliation bringing trauma and pain. In the north, ‘Somaliland’ today even claims its independence although this republic is not recognised within Somalia or by the international community. After years of civil war, inhabitants of Somaliland argue that they have to admit to themselves, ‘if they like it or not,’ that their ‘dream’ of Somali unity was false, that in fact there are deeply important ‘cultural’ differences between them and the other Somalis. They complain bitterly that they have been intensely damaged and insulted by the aggressive and disrespectful behaviour inflicted upon them by Somalis from other regions. ‘Somaliland’ is a strong case for considering the possibility that an emphasis upon ‘culture difference’ and a desire to avoid close contact with those of ‘other’ cultures may be rooted in deeply unpleasant experiences of humiliation.

Also in Germany there is a mood of division despite huge efforts to let ‘grow together what belongs together [zusammenwachsen, was zusammen gehört]’ (Willy Brand 1989). Some Germans, East and West, find their feelings correctly expressed by messages on T-shirts saying ‘I want my wall back.’ Ironically, the separate identity of the ‘Ossies’ seems stronger and more pronounced now that they are, in political and economic terms, integrated much more closely with the ‘Wessies.’ I would suggest that a major reason for this is the division caused by humiliation. The West Germans seem arrogant to their new close neighbours from the East. Meanwhile, the ‘Ossies’ seem ungrateful and complaining. There is disappointment and pain on both sides. Each feels humiliated by the other.

I would argue that, to a considerable degree, the alleged ‘culture differences’ between ‘Somalilanders’ and other Somalis, and between ‘Ossies’ and ‘Wessies’ are, to borrow Benedict Anderson’s word, ‘imagined’ (Anderson 1991). These are ‘imagined cultural
disunities.’ However imaginary the cultural differences, these examples show that humiliation can radically undermine the benign tendencies of the epistemological revolution. Humiliation fosters images of separation, not unity, visions of conflict and revenge, not co-operation and peace. Where rifts run deep, creativity is turned towards the task of perfecting instruments of coercion, not seeking out new means of constructive co-existence. Even worse, such images may be realised in horrifying wars and Holocaust.

Humiliation rigidifies. It encourages a view of the world as divided into separate containers with rigid walls. It undermines or prohibits attempts from outside or inside to make these walls more ‘porous’: ‘If you are not my friend, you are my enemy.’ Fights will be caused not by the scarcity of resources but by humiliation. Any evidence of humiliation, present or past (even long past) will be mobilised to justify rigidification. Serbia finds its justifications in battles waged many hundreds of years ago. In such a situation, where a spirit of isolation prevails, even mobility may be prohibited; ‘Berlin walls’ are erected. Coercing the other becomes acceptable, laudable even, just like in traditional honour societies where it is perfectly ‘right’ to subjugate others.

If we refer back to the themes discussed in the first part of this paper: epistemological revolution, mobility, interdependence, the transition from ‘fear of enemies’ to ‘problems with bad neighbours,’ the increased significance of creativity as a means of growth, the development of an increasingly egalitarian human rights society, the shift to the imagery of ‘one global village,’ - where does humiliation lead us?

Humiliation introduces rifts where interdependence should forbid it; it makes people relapse into the notion of the ‘enemy’ where the notion of ‘bad neighbour’ is the only appropriate one; it may lead people even to build physical walls and use coercion where mobility, communication, and respectful dialogue among equals could reign. Humiliation leads to ‘irrational’ responses that run counter to what rational choice indicates in an interdependent global village. Humiliation breaks down any achievements of the epistemological revolution insofar as it fixes people to stereotypical rigid views of the situation. Conflicts are then not managed by co-operation, but, in the worst case, by violence and war.

To summarise: the epistemological revolution allied to the more benign effects of science and technology is conducive to effective conflict resolution and progress towards peace; the malign consequences of humiliation tend to undermine those tendencies.

Conclusion

People do not love each other just because they are neighbours. Bitter conflicts might boil up instead. The global village must therefore do its utmost to implement sufficient global and local conflict resolution mechanisms, as for example police, law courts, and ‘healing agencies,’ as for example South African Truth Commissions might be called.

Swami Agnivesh opened this article. I want now to conclude with him. He is a holy man, a man of peace, someone who cares deeply for the poor. And yet he defends the nuclear bomb. Why? This paper suggests an answer. It proposes the explanation that Swami Agnivesh wants to make peace, and not war, but not while he is humiliated. In the eyes of people like Swami Agnivesh, the ‘nuclear blackmail’ carried out by foreign countries like America, is evidently humiliating to him and also his entire world region.
The epistemological revolution should enable us to learn how such opinion leaders, whose
behaviour and attitudes are going to affect all our lives, actually think and see the world. It is
neither accurate nor beneficial to dismiss such leaders as ‘crazy’ – a common Western
reaction – rather than make the effort of exercising empathy and taking the other’s
perspective. Not doing this actually hinders peace. Behind apparent craziness there very often
lurk powerful feelings engendered by humiliation. Such feelings have to be healed, not
dismissed.

Bystanders, for example the international community, including its academic advisers, have
to learn to see and address humiliation. A very experienced international senior advisor for
example explains:45 ‘Humiliation is institutionalised in the relation between the international
organisations and the recipient countries. The principles of empowerment are there, but they
are not followed. What is needed today is the exercise of empowerment: co-operation, not
assistance! Joint management of projects, with local partners, then slowly phasing out the
international organisation, this is the way to go. Of course humiliation should not now be
moved from the recipient to the donor, there must be a balance. The bottom line is always:
avoidance of corruption (where does the money go to), transparency, good governance,
accountability.’ He continues, ‘Humiliation is institutionalised in the way international
organisations approach the recipients. It needs the operationalisation of ways how to change
that. Today there is major mistrust on all sides. After a meeting each side will write a report
and give their view, not the view of what the other meant.’

Encouraging examples can be found. Wherever I went during my fieldwork in Africa (1998
and 1999) the War-torn Societies Project in Somalia,46 received a lot of praise for being
different from the common run of NGOs or similar aid agencies. These were often described
to me in terms of a parody that contains elements of truth: They come along, build wells (or
some other installations or services liable to be ecologically unsound or unmanageable in the
longer run), create a few jobs for some chauffeurs, secretaries and security personnel, and
then disappear again.47

The War-torn Societies Project, in contrast, concentrates on ‘research’ and attempts to
develop an agenda for development together with the communities concerned; it thus tries to
‘empower’ people and turn them from ‘recipients’ into ‘ors.’ Empowerment means undoing
humiliation; and ‘research’ means using the skills created by the ‘epistemological revolution,’
namely, moving – intellectually and psychologically - more often and more carefully
between, on one side, the ‘incoming helper’s perception or ideology of what people need as
aid,’ and the ‘support that local people really need’ on the other side.

This example illustrates the point made in this article that globalisation furthers benign human
relations and benign technology (and thus peace) insofar as the epistemological revolution
gains ground and promotes more humble, flexible and empathic views of the world and the
other. Humility is more effective than humiliation.48

To summarise this paper’s argument, the most important feature of globalisation fostering
peace is the ‘epistemological revolution.’ This is a shift to a new meta-paradigm, one of
revising one’s worldview continuously. Today’s new ‘rule,’ both in the academic and non-
academic world, is to be prepared to consult empirical data continuously, ‘listening to reality,’
and, in the light of what one finds, be ready to overhaul one’s beliefs about the world, about
the other, and about oneself. In personal relationships this willingness to revise one’s beliefs
is called dialogue and entails empathy and perspective-taking. This is a radical change from the previous meta-paradigm associated with the old world before the advent of the ‘global village’ where people hold on to fixed and rigid worldviews.

However, this tendency towards flexibility, innovation and dialogue is hampered by the operation of a factor that is too often neglected: humiliation. In the sphere of human relations, humiliation and its emotional consequences typically cause people to fall back into the old meta-paradigm of rigid worldviews, with all its destructive consequences. The point is that humiliation can destroy the conditions for peace that creative dialogue and benign technology have helped to create.

This argument takes issue with the main emphasis within critical theory whose adherents such as Adorno and Horkheimer identify malign technology as the main destroyer of human values. This paper proposes that it is not malign technology but malign human relations that bring war and violence. Fortunately, the ‘epistemological revolution,’ if it continues to gain ground, has the potential to create both benign human relations and benign technology.

 Appropriately, this paper situates itself within the framework of the epistemological revolution. It diagnoses humiliation and its destructive effects with as much empathy as possible in order to facilitate healing treatment. It is vital that malign human relationships receive at least as much attention as malign technology. The article concludes by calling for more awareness of the dynamics of humiliation. The ‘global village’ must do its utmost to implement sufficient conflict management mechanisms that address the feelings of humiliation, not only at the regional or local level, but also at the global level.

Reference List


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1 Swami Agnivesh is the president of the Bonded Labour Liberation Front and a prominent Arya Samaj leader in India.
2 See The Indian Express 1998.
3 Dennis Smith is Professor of Sociology at Loughborough University (UK). I am grateful to him for suggestions relating to this paragraph. The ideas presented in this paper, and many other arguments, will be developed further in a book I am currently writing in collaboration with Dennis Smith; see his publications: Smith 2000a; Smith 2000b; Smith 2000c; Smith 1999; Smith 1997a; Smith 1997b; Smith 1991; Smith 1984a; Smith 1984b; Smith 1983; Smith 1981.
4 Smith 2000b forthcoming.
5 See, for example, Adorno and Horkheimer 1979.
6 For commentaries on Habermas, see {Outhwaite 1994 3103 /id}; {White 1995 3104 /id}.
The project is entitled: The Feeling of Being Humiliated: A Central Theme in Armed Conflicts. A Study of the Role of Humiliation in Somalia, and Rwanda/Burundi, Between the Warring Parties, and in Relation to Third Intervening Parties. See www.uio.no/~evelinl. The project is supported by the Norwegian Research Council and the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I am grateful for their support, and would also like to thank the Institute of Psychology at the University of Oslo for hosting the project. I extend my warmest thanks to all my informants in and from Africa, many of whom survive under the most difficult life circumstances. I hope that at some point in the future I will be able to give back at least a fraction of all the support I received from them! I thank Reidar Ommundsen at the Institute of Psychology at the University of Oslo for his continuous support, together with Jan Smedslund, Hilde Nafstad, Malvern Lumsden (Lumsden 1997), Carl-Erik Grenness, Jon Martin Sundet, Finn Tschudi, Kjell Flekkoy, and Astrid Bastiansen. Michael Harris Bond, Chinese University of Hong Kong, helped with constant feedback and support (see Bond 2000; Smith and Bond 1999; Bond 1998; Bond 1996; Bond and Venus 1991; Bond, Chiu, and Wan 1984). Without Lee D. Ross’s encouragement my research would not have been possible; Lee Ross is a principal investigator and co-founder of the Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation (SCCN). I also thank Pierre Dasen, Professeur en approches interculturelles de l'éducation, Université en Genève, Département de Psychologie, for his most valuable support. The project is interdisciplinary and has benefited from the help of many colleagues at the University of Oslo and elsewhere. The project would not have been possible without the help of Dennis Smith, professor of sociology at Loughborough University (UK). I would especially like to thank Johan Galtung (Galtung 1996; Galtung and Tschudi 1999), Jan Oberg, William Ury, Director, Project on Preventing War, Harvard University (Ury 1999; Fisher, Ury, and Patton 1991), Heidi von Weltzien Hoivik and Andreas Føllesdal (Weltzien Hoivik and Føllesdal 1995), Dagfinn Follesdal (Follesdal Robert Sokolowski 1988), Thomas Pogge, Helge Høybråten, Thorleif Lund, Thomas Hylland Eriksen (Eriksen 1993a), Unni Wikan (Wikan 1984), Asbjorn Eide and Bernt Hagtvet (Eide and Hagtvet 1996), Leif Ahnstrøm, and Jan Brøgger (Brøgger 1986).

See also Lindner 1994.

Feyerabend discusses in Against Method that reality-testing should critically include its own methods and not stick to rigid views of what is right or wrong methodology. Even the methods of reality-testing should be reality-tested! (Feyerabend 1988).


Post-modern thinkers may or may not be right. I suggest they will have to revise this conclusion in the light of the epistemological revolution. On postmodernity, see, for example Bauman 1992 and Smith 1999.

See Lindner 1994 about quality of life.

See for example Barber 1996; Blake 1998; Cooperrider and Pasmore 1991; Featherstone 1990; Lindner Breines, Gierycz, and Reardon 1999. The formation of the global village is evidently not only dependent on the availability of technology that enhances mobility and communication; it is also dependent on the size of the globe in relation to this technology. For example, humankind might not have been able to include the whole globe into the global village yet if it were so large that today’s technology could not master its size. Furthermore, technology that enhances mobility and communication would not have any effect if people were not inclined to use it. This technology is helped along, for example, by the existence of age-old dreams such as the dream of flying. Also the status connected to technology facilitates its use, - it is perhaps therefore that, although a donkey may be much more adapted to a task than a tractor, still, hardly any farmer in the world would prefer the donkey (see the author’s seven years of immersing into Egyptian culture in 1984-1991, complemented by fieldwork in China and South East Asia in the beginning of the 1980s).

Ury takes archaeology as evidence: War-related findings before ten thousand years are rare and allow us the ‘educated hunch’ that therefore also war was rare (Ury 1999).

Smith and Bond, global social psychologists, teach us what we need to know about social psychology across cultures (Smith and Bond 1999). And Ross educates us about the pitfalls of naïve

19 Quoted from Bond 1998, 6.

20 See for gender and International Relations Theory for example Grant and Newland 1991; Sylvester 1994.


24 See also Lindner Breines, Gierycz, and Reardon 1999 and Lindner 2000d.

25 One early instance of this would be the abolition of the highly exploitative and destructive practices of the African slave trade once Africa was brought ‘inside’ the global structures of capitalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

26 Startling though it may appear at first sight, the comparison between creativity in general and love and sexual arousal, most visible in the male erection, is instructive. Neither can be forced or produced on command. Marriage counselling and management courses on creativity have a lot in common. Love and creativity, un-forcible as they both are, require complex skills in their handling if they are to provide stable foundations for love relationships or creative professional solutions. Simply commanding or obeying is not only insufficient, but also counterproductive.

27 See Lindner 2000b; Lindner 2000c, both forthcoming.

28 Quoted in Lindner 2000b, forthcoming.

29 This reference is supposedly the first reference in English. It comes from Derek Sweetman, editor of the Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution, who found it in Lowe 1997, primarily on pages 129-146. Sweetman’s reflections are part of a discussion on the ‘Peace List’ about ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ peace.

30 The ‘temporary peace’ reminds of Galtung’s term ‘negative peace’ (Galtung 1969), while ‘true peace’ seems to be very close to Galtung’s concept of ‘positive peace.’

31 For example, Miller wrote a book entitled Humiliation and Other Essays on Honor, Social Discomfort, and Violence (Miller 1993). Two journals have dedicated issues to the topic in recent years. Social Research in 1997; the Journal of Primary Prevention in 1992. Humiliation has been addressed in such fields as international relations, love, sex, and social attractiveness, depression, society and identity formation, sports, serial murder, war and violence. A few examples from history, literature and film illustrate humiliation. Related themes though, as for example shame, guilt, trauma, self-esteem, trust, social dominance, power, etc. have been studied much more extensively. See Baumeister, Wotman, and Stillwell 1993; Brown, Harris, and Hepworth 1995; Brossat 1995; Cvic 1993; Gilbert 1997; Gilligan 1996; Hale 1994; Hardman et al. 1996; Lehmann 1995; Luo 1993; Markus, Kitayama, and Heimann Higgins and Kruglanski 1996; Masson 1996; Midiohouan 1991; Miller 1988; Proulx et al. 1994; Schlesinger 1998; Silver et al. 1986; Toles 1995; Urban Prins 1990; Vogel and Lazare 1990; Wood et al. 1994; Vachon 1993; Zender 1994.

Feelings and violence have been addressed by more authors. See for example Bar-On 1996; Moses 1999; Volkman, Demetrios, and Montville 1999; Scheff, Retzinger, and Gordon 1992; Scheff 1997; Scheff 1988; Scheff Kemper 1990; Rapoport 1995; Stadtwald 1992; Steinberg 1991a; Steinberg 1991b; Steinberg 1996; Staub 1989; Volkman, Demetrios, and Montville 1990.

32 The term ‘humiliation’ has roots in the Latin word humus, or earth. Spatially, it entails a downward orientation, literally a ‘de-gradation.’ ‘Ned-verdigelse’ (Norwegian), ‘Er-niedrig-ung’ (German), ‘a-baisse-ment’ (French), all mean ‘de-gradation.’ All these words are built on the same spatial, orientational metaphor. To humiliate is, clearly, to strike down, put down or take down. Lakoff and Johnson describe orientational metaphors as up-down, in-out, front-back, on-off, deep-shallow, and central-peripheral (Lakoff and Johnson 1980).

33 See also Amir 1969; Forbes 1997; Hewstone and Brown 1986; Pettigrew 1998.

34 Research carried out within Canada.
Greenfeld draws a line between resentment and nationalism (Greenfeld 1992).

See for example the work of Retzinger and Scheff. See also James Gilligan, a psychiatrist, who argues that humiliation is the origin of violence (Gilligan 1996).

Lindner 2000c, forthcoming.

Trauma leads to stress, see Post-traumatic stress disorder. See also Dasen, Berry, and Sartorius 2000.

See for ‘moral disengagement’ Bandura Reich 1990.

‘There was during the colonial period a British Somaliland, an Italian Somaliland, and a French Somaliland. A section of the Somali people was also absorbed separately into Kenya under British colonial rule. The fifth component became the Ogaden, a section of Ethiopia. The dream of independence for the Somali was in part a dream of reunification’ (Mazrui 1986, 71).

In 1978 Somalia tried to incorporate the Ogaden by attacking Ethiopia. The failure to do so set off a cascade of civil war, quasi-genocidal killings in the North, and 1991 the ultimate dissolution of Somalia as a state.

According to Bauman, in a post-modern world our neighbours become ‘strangers.’ I would argue that, to some degree, this ‘estrangement’ facilitates and is facilitated by humiliation. Healing humiliation can also help to overcome estrangement. See Bauman 1997, 17-34.

As Swami Agnivesh explained in a BBC interview (December 1999) he used to demonstrate against nuclear power, and he advocates disarmament. In his view, Pakistan and India should test the bomb jointly and later also disarm together.


See Maren 1997.

Desmond Tutu is another encouraging example. In his recent book Out of the Shadows. What the TRC Achieved in Search of the Truth Desmond Tutu ‘teaches’ the world about respect, listening and forgiveness (Tutu 1999). Michael Bond, intercultural psychologist at the global level, refers to Tutu and reminds also academics that cycles of violence and revenge have to be attended to: ‘I think we too in the inter-group area need to be looking at this important topic in our work [see Desmond Tutu's recent book], as a way to healing between groups. We must break these vicious cycles.’ January 2000 in a personal message.